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THE EQUAL ACCESS ACT-RELIGIOUS
CLUBS MAY MEET DURING PUBLIC
SECONDARY SCHOOL MANDATORY
ATTENDANCE PERIODS IF No
DISCRETE ACADEMIC INSTRUCTION

TAKING

Is

PLACE-Donovan v.

Punxsutawney, 336 F.3d 211
(3d Cir. 2003).
Elizabeth S. Thompson

HE Equal Access Act ("EAA") prohibits public secondary
schools from denying noncurriculum related student groups equal
access to hold club meetings when other noncurriculum student
groups have been given the opportunity to meet during noninstructional
time.' In Donovan v. Punxsutawney, a recent case dealing with the interpretation of the EAA, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that according to the plain language of the statute, "noninstructional time" can
include a school period when students are required to be present at the
school but are not being given discrete academic instruction. 2 Because of
both the plain language of and the congressional intent behind the EAA,
the Third Circuit correctly interpreted "noninstructional time" as defined
by the EAA to permit religious club meetings at public secondary schools
during times of mandatory attendance, provided that there is a "limited
open forum" and the students are not receiving discrete classroom
instruction.
The EAA applies to public secondary schools that receive federal financial assistance and have a "limited open forum."'3 As background, the
statute defines a "limited open forum" as an "opportunity for one or
more noncurriculum related student groups to meet on school premises
during noninstructional time."' 4 Additionally, "noninstructional time" is
defined as "time set aside by the school before actual classroom instruc1. Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071-4074 (2000).
2. 336 F.3d 211, 227 (3d Cir. 2003).

3. 20 U.S.C. § 4071(a).
4. Id. § 4071(b).
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tion begins or after actual classroom instruction ends."' 5 Meetings are
"those activities of student groups which are permitted under a school's
"limited open forum" and are not directly related to the school curricu-

lum."'6 The EAA now controls the law relating to the rights of student-

led groups in public high schools; 7 however, the courts have differed in8
the specific application and interpretation of the statute's terminology.
The Punxsutawney Area High School ("PAHS") is just such a "public
secondary school that receives federal financial assistance." 9 PAHS holds
an activity period every day from 8:15 a.m. to 8:54 a.m., after the homeroom attendance is taken.' 0 During that time, students are allowed to go
to club meetings, take make-up tests, or attend a study hall, but they may
not leave the campus." The school allows voluntary, noncurriculum related clubs to meet during this time, including a ski club,12a future health
services club, and an anti-alcohol and anti-tobacco club.
The plaintiff, PAHS senior Melissa Donovan, leads a Bible club called
FISH. 13 The focus of the club is on community service and "other issues
of concern to students of [PAHS] from a Christian perspective;" prayer is
held at the beginning and end of each meeting. 14 The club never sought
permission to meet during the activity period, because the plaintiff expected the request would be denied; indeed, the defendants stipulated
that FISH would not be allowed to meet during the activity period beconvene at 7:15
cause of its religious nature.1 5 Instead, the club may only
6
a.m., a time when no other club is required to meet.'
In January of 2002, Donovan filed suit against PAHS under the First
and Fourteenth Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the EAA, alleging
that PAHS violated her First Amendment free speech rights by refusing
to allow FISH to meet at the school during the activity period simply
because of the club's religious nature.' 7 She filed a motion seeking a temporary restraining order, along with a permanent injunction "prohibiting
the defendants from denying her access to school facilities during the ac5. Id. § 4072(4).

6. Id. § 4072(3).
7. Donovan, 336 F.3d at 220.
8. See, e.g., Bd. of Edu. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 244-46
(1990) (defining a "noncurriculum related student group" as a club centered around a subject that "does not directly relate to any courses offered by the school and is not required
by any courses offered by the school"); Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074, 1086-88 (9th Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 62 (2003) (holding that the term "public funds" does not
include funds that "subsidize club expenditures consistent with [the school's] educational
mission" and that "noninstructional time" cannot occur during times of mandatory attendance at the public secondary school).
9. Donovan, 336 F.3d at 214.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 215.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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tivity period;" she also sought a preliminary injunction requiring the
school board and school district to allow the club to meet during the ac18
tivity period while a final decision was pending.
Finding that the claim was unlikely to succeed on the merits, the District Court denied the motion. 19 The District Court further held that the
EAA would not apply to the school's activity period because it was not
"noninstructional time" as defined in the statute, because it occurred during a time of mandatory attendance. 20 The decision was based in part on
the fact that the school counts the activity period toward the minimum
number of instructional hours required by the state. 21 The District Court
held that the school district "had a compelling interest in not violating the
Establishment Clause," and this compelling interest outweighed Donovan's First Amendment interests.2 2 Donovan appealed the final order
23
closing the case.
At issue in recent cases involving the EAA has been the appropriate
application of the term "noninstructional time" to various public school
periods, and specifically as to whether noninstructional time can occur
during periods of mandatory attendance. 24 The court in Donovan directly faced such an issue when determining whether the activity period
in question constituted "noninstructional time" under the EAA.2 5 The
26
Third Circuit Court of Appeals compared the District Court's reasoning
with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal's recent decision in Prince v.
Jacoby,27 which similarly held that actual classroom instruction as defined
by the EAA is triggered by mandatory attendance.2 8 The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals then compared the Princedecision with another Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Ceniceros v. Board of Trustees of the
San Diego School District,which seemed to contradict the Princeholding
because it defined a lunch period as "noninstructional time because it was
time set aside by the school before actual classroom instruction begins or
'2 9
after classroom instruction ends."
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 224.
Id. at 215.

23. Id.

24. See Ceniceros v. Bd. of Trs. of the San Diego Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 878, 880-81 (9th
Cir. 1997) (holding that, although lunch periods were times of mandatory attendance, because they were treated as noninstructional time and other groups were meeting, a Christian club had the right to meet to the same extent); Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074, 1088-89
(9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 62 (2003) (holding that because "mandatory attendance marks the beginning of 'actual classroom instruction,"' a religious group could not
meet during an open period called student/staff time when other noncurricular clubs were
allowed to meet).
25. Donovan, 336 F.3d at 221.
26. See supra text accompanying notes 19-22.
27. Prince, 303 F.3d at 1087-89.
28. Donovan, 336 F.3d at 222 (citing Prince, 303 F.3d at 1088).
29. Id. at 223 (citing Ceniceros, 106 F.3d at 880 (internal quotations omitted)).
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Rejecting the Ninth Circuit's Prince analysis, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals held that according to the plain meaning of the EAA, there can
be times of mandatory attendance falling within a school day that are
"noninstructional" as defined by the statute if no discrete classroom instruction is taking place.30 Because the EAA would therefore apply, a
noncurricular religious club should be allowed to meet to the same extent
as other noncurricular clubs. 3 1 Writing for the court, Judge Aldisert
looked at the meetings held during the activity period under the EAA
and found that the activity period was open to various noncurricular
clubs, the initial determination for finding a "limited open forum. '32 The
court rejected the school district's attempt to proscribe FISH from meeting during the activity period by counting it as a state-required instructional hour, because PAHS "cannot be permitted to evade application of
the EAA by stating that a period that is otherwise a 'limited open forum'
does not constitute 'noninstructional time' under the EAA simply because the school system chooses to count that
time toward the state mini'33
mum number of hours of instruction time."
In considering the issue of noninstructional time as defined in the
EAA, the court held that
[t]he very phrases "noninstructional time" and "actual classroom instruction" demonstrate that there may very well be times in the
school day during which students would not be receiving "actual
classroom instruction." Under this reading that is both plain and coherent, the PAHS'34activity period falls into the category of "noninstructional time.
The court found that just because students were able to seek classroom
instruction during that time, the entire session was not therefore instructional: "[s]imply because the period may fall within the more general parameters of the school day does not indicate that all time within those
parameters necessarily constitutes actual classroom instruction. '35 While
the court noted that being present at the school was mandatory, the students were not required to attend any specific club meeting, such as
FISH: "[i]t is not mandatory attendance at the school, but mandatory attendance at the group's meeting that raises Establishment Clause
36
concerns.",
Looking at the plain meaning of the statute, the court found that "[i]n
drafting the EAA, Congress could have said 'before or after the school
day' or 'before or after classes,' but it did not. Instead it used the concept
of 'actual classroom instruction,' which we take to mean classroom in30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Donovan, 336 F.3d at 223-24.
See id.
Id. at 221.
Id. at 225.
Id. at 222.
Id.
Id. at 224.
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struction in discrete areas."' 37 The court also held that restricting FISH
from meeting simply because it discussed subjects from a religious perspective constituted viewpoint discrimination. 38 Therefore, the court
held that "permitting FISH to meet during the PAHS activity period
would not have violated the Establishment Clause . . . [and] that the
PAHS activity period constitutes 'noninstructional time' under the
39
EAA."
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals correctly interpreted the EAA by
allowing for the possibility that noninstructional time as defined by the
EAA can occur during times of mandatory attendance at a public secondary school. 40 Congress passed the EAA to counter the perceived discrimination of public secondary schools against religious speech and
content. 41 Thus the court in Donovan correctly used the plain language
rule to interpret the EAA and hold that while requiring attendance at a
club would raise Establishment Clause concerns, allowing a meeting to
occur when attendance at the school is required would not.4 2 The court
in Prince had relied heavily on discussions that occurred during the Congressional legislative debates to support their contention that once attendance is required, instructional time necessarily begins. 43 But the
language of the EAA itself does not restrict the opportunity to times
before and after the school day starts - rather, it designates the time as
"before actual classroom instruction begins or after actual classroom instruction ends."4 4 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals was correct to rely
it broadly, because that
on the plain language of the statute and read
45
corresponds with Congress' goal for the Act.
Additionally, as Congress was concerned about the perceived discrimination against students expressing religious speech, the EAA is also supposed to discourage public secondary schools from sending a message of
hostility against religion to the students. When a school treats a religious
club differently from every other club, a message might be inferred that
37. Id. The court emphasized using the plain language of the statute, and rejected
using the legislative history where it was not needed. See id. at 221-23 (citing United States
v. Hodge, 321 F.3d 429, 436 (3d Cir. 2003) ("[W]e begin with the plain meaning of [the]
statute."); and Zubi v. AT&T Corp., 219 F.3d 220, 231 (3d Cir. 2000) ("Recourse to the
legislative history ... is unnecessary in light of the plain meaning of the statutory text.")).
38. Id. at 225-26.
39. Id. at 227.
40. See id.
41. Id. at 219; Prince v. Jacoby, 303 F.3d 1074, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 124
S. Ct. 62 (2003); see also Bd. of Educ. of the Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,
241 (1990) ("Congress clearly sought to prohibit schools from discriminating on the basis
of the content of a student group's speech.").
42. Donovan, 336 F.3d at 224. "Where the intent of Congress 'has been expressed in
reasonably plain terms, that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive."' Id. at
222 (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982)).
43. Prince, 303 F.3d at 1088-89.
44. Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C. § 4072(4) (2000).
45. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 239 (stating that a "broad reading of the Act would be consistent with the views of those who sought to end discrimination by allowing students to meet
and discuss religion before and after classes").
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those expressing religious speech are "subversive of American ideals and
therefore subject to unique disabilities. '46 Thus when schools allow any
other noncurriculum related clubs to meet but deny the same rights to a
student-led club merely because the club's meeting has religious content,
the refusal creates the appearance of hostility against religion, not an appearance of neutrality toward religion. 47 This not only violates the stu48
dents' right to free expression but also the Establishment Clause.
The decision in the Donovan case creates a circuit split between the
Third and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals regarding the meaning of
"noninstructional time" and whether times when students are required to
attend school but are not receiving discrete classroom instruction can fit
that definition. Because this term has been subjected to differing interpretations in the current case law, public secondary schools worried about
violating the Establishment Clause may continue to disallow religious student groups the same opportunity to meet that they give to other noncurricular student groups. 49 This may happen despite that it is the clear
intent of Congress to stop such discrimination 50 and that refusing to allow
religious student groups to participate on the campus to the same extent
as other student groups "would demonstrate not neutrality but hostility
toward religion. ' 51 If religious student groups are continually excluded
from fair opportunity of participation, more claims may be brought
against school districts, and the uncertainty in the area may necessitate a
clear holding on the issue from the Supreme Court.

46. Id. at 248 (quoting McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 641 (1978)).
47. See id.
48. See id.
49. As was part of the PAHS's rational for denying FISH the right to meet during the
morning activity period. See Donovan, 336 F.3d at 215.
50. Donovan, 336 F.3d at 219.
51. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 248.
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